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Abstract
We analyse the issue of justice in the allocation of resources across generations. Our
starting point is that if all generations have a claim to natural resources, then each
generation should be entitled to exercise veto power on the unpalatable choices of the
other generations. We analyse this situation as one of bargaining à la Rubinstein, Safra
and Thomson [15], which incorporates a notion of justice as mutual advantage, rather
than justice as impartiality, as in the Kantian-Rawlsian tradition. Our framework
captures some key aspects of the interaction between isolated agents in a Hobbesian
state of nature, in which agents are not placed behind a veil of ignorance, but none
of them is sufficiently strong to impose their will against all others (state of war of all
against all). We analyse some new social welfare relations emerging from this Hobbesian framework.
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Introduction

How should resources be allocated across generations? If there is an exhaustible resource
that each generation has the power to run down completely, what is the fair proportion that
should be saved for future generations?
The interest of each generation clashes with the interest of future and past generations,
and the normative question of how to best solve this problem is complex and still open, in
the sense that various requirements that are appealing at the normative level are mutually
incompatible.1 One stream of this literature puts at its core an economy in which each
generation tackles the problem of how to distribute the available resources between the
present cohort of agents and those that will come in the future. The other instead considers
the problem of ranking infinite utility streams without investigating how these have come
about. In essence this latter approach favours an agnostic position vis a vis the unknown
possibilities and avenues that future technological progress might open (or close), focusing
on the “purest” problem of intergenerational equity where the issues concerning how the
available resources could be invested/preserved are eschewed. One consequence of this is
the lack of ‘discipline’ in the type of infinite utility streams that a planner might have to
compare - such general setup makes the problem of impossibilities even worse.2
Our contribution lies in this second strand of the literature, from which we depart by
dropping the usual requirement of justice as fairness or impartiality, as in the KantianRawlsian tradition, in favour of a notion of justice as mutual advantage (for a discussion
of these two perspectives in theories of distributive justice, see Barry [4]), by adopting a
bargaining framework.
1

If we take fairness across generations as a basic tenet of interegenerational justice, the requirements
of Pareto efficiency and anonimity clash with being able to compare any two infinite utility streams (see,
for example, Diamond [8], and Arrow [1] for the maximin principles, or more recently Hara, Shinotsuka,
Suzumura and Xu [11]. Asheim [2] is a thorough recent review of this literature). Indeed, there are various
normatively appealing axioms that are mutually incompatible, in the sense that there is no social welfare
function that satisfies all of them. Recently, Asheim, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [3] (who also contain
helpful references for the above literature) have promoted a new approach that in a way relaxes the need
for completeness: rather than attempting to rank all possible infinite utility streams, they opt for a choice
theoretic approach, and what is required is a social welfare choice function that can pick the most desirable
utility stream among any collection of alternative vectors. This setup is fruitful, as e.g. some of the
aforementioned impossibilities are resolved.
2
See, for example, Ferejohn and Page [9] or Bossert and Suzumura [6].
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Our starting point is that if all generations have a claim to natural resources, then
each generation should be entitled to exercise veto power on the (from its point of view)
unpalatable choices of the other generations. Technically, we translate this into adopting
as a modeling tool a multiperson version of the bargaining framework à la Rubinstein,
Safra and Thomson [15], which we apply to an intergenerational context. As an alternative
interpretation, we analyse the Social Welfare Relations (henceforth, SWR) that would emerge
from the interaction between individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature. The key features of
the Hobbesian state of nature are that, first, individuals are interconnected but they do not
cooperate (actually, they are in a state of war of all against all). Indeed, agents are isolated
- in Hobbes’s own terms, their lives are ‘solitary’ (Leviathan, chapter xiii) - and do not form
coalitions. Second, agents are not placed behind a veil of ignorance (unlike in the original
position of the contractarian tradition), but none of them is sufficiently strong to impose
their will against all others.
We begin by identifying a new SWR that satisfies the requirements above, which we dub
‘Hobbesian Social Welfare Relation’, and study its properties.
An advantage of using this novel relation as the basis for welfare is that it can handle
infinite numbers of agents easily, thus fitting naturally an intergenerationl context. However,
as we will see, it comes with some shortcomings. Similarly to the unpalatable behaviour of
the standard utilitarian approach to welfare, it is possible that the Hobbesian SWR ranks
a profile which privileges a single individual at the disadvantage of many others above a
profile where all individuals but the privileged one have high levels of utility. Like for the
standard utilitarian approach (e.g. Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [5]) the effects of the
Hobbesian SWR can be tempered by requiring some form of protection of future generations. Indeed, more generally, our analysis highlights some deep, and perhaps surprising,
connections between utilitarianism and the Hobbesian SWRs emerging from bargaining in
the state of nature.
However, there are other shortcomings that cannot be accommodated in a similar fashion, and that require us to change the Hobbesian SWR in a more substantial way. This
analysis leads us to the formulation of a modified, anonymous Hobbesian social welfare ordering, which can be interpreted as mediating between the two different views of justice as
3

impartiality and justice as mutual advantage.
We offer no definite conclusions at this stage. The Hobbesian SWR is interesting in its
own right as it captures some reasonable normative intuitions, in various morally relevant
contexts. Our contribution, however, can also be seen as an exploration of the implications
of bargaining approaches to justice. The philosophical foundations and the implications of
approaches focusing on justice as mutual advantage have been questioned (see, for example,
Barry [4] and Roemer [13]). Critics have also argued out that the approach is ill-suited to deal
with intergenerational justice, since removed generations cannot benefit from interaction.
Yet the bargaining approach to justice is one of the most influential traditions in political
philosophy and its main exponents have consistently applied it to intergenerational problems
(see, most notably, Gauthier, [10], chapter IX, section 6). It is therefore of clear theoretical
interest to analyse systematically the implications of a bargaining-theoretic approach to
intergenerational justice.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic analytical
and conceptual framework of our approach to justice as mutual advantage in the intergenerational context. We show how noncooperative bargaining between generations characterises
a Hobbesian SWR. In section 3, we then study the properties of the Hobbesian SWR, focusing in particular on intergenerational issues, and the connections between our approach
and utilitarianism. We also discuss how the bargaining framework can be modified to accommodate some focal issues in debates on intergenerational justice, such as discounting
and sustainability. Some shortcomings of the Hobbesian SWR are also highlighted which
lead us to propose, in section 4, a modified Hobbesian social welfare relation which satisfies
anonymity and transitivity. Section 5 concludes.

2

Bargaining in the State of Nature

Let N be a set of agents. N can be composed by an infinite number of members. We think
of the members of N as ‘generations’, but the framework applies to other contexts. Let Rn
denote the n-dimensional Euclidean space. Let < be a (binary) relation over Rn . For any
p, q ∈ Rn , we write p < q for (p, q) ∈< and p 6< q for (p, q) ∈<.
/
The asymmetric factor
4

Â of < is defined by p Â q if and only if p < q and p 6< q, and the symmetric part ∼ of
< is defined by p ∼ q if and only if p < q and q < p. A relation < on Rn is said to be:
reflexive if, for any p ∈ Rn , p < p; complete if, for any p, q ∈ Rn , p 6= q implies p < q or
q < p; transitive if, for any p, q, r ∈ Rn , p < q < r implies p < r. < is a quasi-ordering if it
is reflexive and transitive, while < is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering. Finally,
the vector notation is: x > y (resp. x >> y) iff xi ≥ yi for all i and x 6= y (resp. iff xi > yi
for all i).
Our objective is to identify a SWR < on Rn , emerging from a situation of ‘social bargaining’ over welfare allocations. Here Rn denotes the set of welfare allocations among agents,
or generations, so that if p ∈ Rn , then pi represents the welfare level of agent i ∈ N . We
imagine a state of nature in which agents are all interconnected, but isolated and cannot form
coalitions, as in the Hobbesian state of war of all against all. Consistently with Hobbes’s
theory, agents are assumed to have equal bargaining strengths and bargaining takes place as
in a multiperson version of Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson’s [15] interpretation of the Nash
Bargaining solution (see also Roemer [13]).
Formally, assume that gains/losses are interpreted additively. Given a proposed profile
p, suppose that somebody is willing to pay a cost e > 0 in order to object to p and propose
a different profile q instead. The objection is invalid if there is somebody who is willing
to pay the same cost e > 0 in order to counterpropose to go back from q to p. The cost
e > 0 is arbitrary: so we would like to declare a profile p as unobjectionable against q if any
objection to p meets a counterobjection of the type above, no matter what e > 0 applies.
More precisely:
Definition 1 Allocation p is unobjectionable against q if, for all e > 0, whenever there is
i ∈ N such that qi − e > pi , there is a j ∈ N such that pj − e > qj .
This form of bargaining is an adaptation of two-person games analysed by Rubinstein,
Safra and Thomson [15]. Two points are worth noting about the structure of the bargaining
process. First, one may question the assumption that agents cannot pool (or transfer)
resources in order to make counterproposals. Yet, this is theoretically consistent with the
interpretation of the bargaining scenario as a stylised representation of the Hobbesian state of
5

nature in which we imagine generations to be engaged in. All agents are interconnected but
isolated and noncooperative (actually, in war against each other). This conceptual structure
of the state of nature underlies the ‘individualistic logic’ of the bargaining process. However,
some libertarian (and therefore strongly individualistic) interpretations of the Lockean state
of nature would also be consistent with the logic of the bargaining scenario.
Second, Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson [15] used multiplicative, rather than additive
costs. If welfare is level comparable, additive costs are justified. However, a multiplicative
version of the same welfare criterion would emerge if only percentage gains/losses could be
interpersonally compared.
It is easy to see that the following holds:
Proposition 1 For any p, q ∈ Rn , p is unobjectionable against q if and only if
max(pi − qi ) ≥ max(qi − pi ).
i∈N

i∈N

To see this, observe that by Definition 1, p is unobjectionable against q, if for all e > 0,
for all i in N such that qi − pi > e, there is j in N such that pj − qj > e. This can be written
as follows: for all e > 0, max(qi − pi ) > e ⇒ max(pi − qi ) > e. The desired result follows
i∈N

i∈N

from the latter inequality.

3

The Hobbesian Social Welfare Relation

3.1

Some key properties

The previous analysis suggests that bargaining in the state of nature provides a theoretical
foundation for the following Hobbesian SWR.
Definition 2 (Hobbesian SWR) p <H q if and only if max(pi − qi ) ≥ max(qi − pi ).
i∈N

i∈N

It is immediate to note that <H is reflexive and complete. In this section, a number of
additional properties of <H are discussed.

6

First, <H reflects an ‘individualistic’ logic: there is no aggregation, no distributional
consideration: only naked but open bargaining. Agents are all interconnected, but isolated
(they can even be imagined as sending public e-mails while isolated in their cubicles). This
feature clearly derives from the individualistic logic of the bargaining structure, which seems
particularly apt to capture some key characteristics of the interaction between generations.
Second, we stress again that the social preferences incorporated into <H do not reflect a
notion of justice as impartiality, but rather of justice as mutual advantage. Therefore p <H q
is properly interpreted as stating that ‘p is unobjectionable against q’, and <H might reflect
a minimal notion of ‘justice as absence of objections’ deriving from the underlying procedure.
In other words, although no agent has enough strength to be a dictator, each agent does
have veto power. From the viewpoint of intergenerational justice, the structure of bargaining
and the resulting SWR establish a relevant form of procedural justice by assigning to each
generation the power to veto the unpalatable choices of the other generations. This seems
a key aspect in current debates on the effect of current decisions on nonrenewable resources
and climate change.
Third, although <H has very different theoretical foundations as compared to approaches
emphasising the notion of justice as impartiality, there are some interesting, and perhaps
surprising connections between <H and other well-known SWOs. To analyse them, consider
the following standard axioms in social choice theory:
Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO): p > q ⇒ p Â q.
Anonymity (A): a ∼ πa for any permutation π.
Cardinality and unit comparability (CU): Let a1 , a2 , ..., an be any real numbers and b be any
positive number. Then for any p, q ∈ Rn , p < q if and only if (a1 + bp1 , a2 + bp2 , ...) <
(a1 + bq1 , a2 + bq2 , ...).
Next, define the utilitarian ordering <U by:
U

pÂ q⇔

n
X
k=1

pk >

n
X

qk .

k=1

Consider first 2-person societies. If N = {1, 2}, then the following immediately follows.
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Proposition 2 Let N = {1, 2}. Then <H =<U .
Note that <H is transitive on R2 and it satisfies SPO, A, and CU. Therefore, the result
is implied by D’Aspremont [7], Theorem 3.3.4, p. 51.
Intuitively, (p1 , p2 ) is better than (q1 , q2 ) if the loss for 1 at p compared to q is smaller than
the gain for 2 at p compared to q (or viceversa). Therefore, interestingly, the above argument
provides bargaining-theoretic foundations to utilitarianism in R2 and, if our interpretation
of the barganing procedure as a representation of the Hobbesian state of nature is correct,
this argument shows a theoretical link between the Hobbesian and the utilitarian traditions.
In more general societies, however, the relation between the Hobbesian SWR and classical
utilitarianism is somewhat weaker. If N = {1, ..., n} , with n > 2, rankings can be far from
utilitarian: (2, 2, 2, 2, 2) is better than (3, 3, 3, 3, 0). <H is not maximin or leximin, either:
(1, 1, 4) is better than (2, 2, 2).
Moreover, <H satisfies SPO and CU, but in general it does not satisfy A. For example,
(8, 0, 1) ÂH (0, 1, 8). This is not too surprising given that the starting point of our analysis is
a notion of justice as mutual advantage and <H is the outcome of individualistic bargaining
in a Hobbesian state of nature. The axiom of anonymity is a fundamental notion of justice
as impartiality, or justice as fairness and it is best embodied in the Rawlsian assumption of
individuals acting under a veil of ignorance. Instead in a Hobbesian state of nature agents
know their identities.
Interestingly, though, it is immediate to prove that <H does satisfy a weaker notion of
anonymity (d’Aspremont [7], p. 51):
Weak Anonymity (WA): For all i, j ∈ N , there are p, q ∈ Rn such that pi > qi , pj < qj ,
ph = qh , all h 6= i, j, and q ∼ p.
This highlights some potentially deeper connection with utilitarianism.

In fact, let

λ ∈ Rm
+ imply λi ≥ 0 for all i, and λ 6= 0, and consider the following generalisation of
utilitarianism due to d’Aspremont ([7], p. 46):
Definition 3 (Generalized m-person utilitarianism) A SWO < is called m-utilitarian,
1 ≤ m ≤ n, if for every subset M of m individuals there is some λ ∈ Rm
+ such that for all
P
P
p, q ∈ Rn , with ph = qh for every h not in M , p < q ⇔ i∈M λi pi ≥ i∈M λi qi .
8

The following result is proved in ([7], Theorem 3.3.4, p.51):
Proposition 3 A SWO < is n-utilitarian if and only if it satisfies SPO, WA, and CU.
Because <H satisfies WA, it follows that <H is Hobbesian not only in terms of the
bargaining-theoretical procedure underlying it, but also in the sense that although the choice
of allocations is determined by the welfare of one individual (the Hobbesian sovereign), whose
welfare gain is greatest, this individual is not a dictator. Also, the result clarifies formally
our previous assertion that there is a deeper connection with utilitarianism. In fact, since <H
satisfies SPO, WA and CU then it may be said that the only difference with n-utilitarianism
is transitivity.

3.2

Discounting

In the case of resource allocation, it is conceivable that ignorance of the technological advances available in the future generates considerable current uncertainty on future prospects.
In addition, any evaluation of alternative prospects from the point of view of the ‘current’
generation may make it difficult to appraise what preferences the generations to come will
hold. In this perspective it may be ethically sound to somewhat try and limit the veto power
of future generations. To be sure, a number of objections can be, and have been moved to
the asymmetric treatment of different generations and the ethical foundations of discounting
are at the centre of a vast debate. Our objective here is not to defend discounting and the
asymmetric treatment of generations in the allocation of natural resources. Our aim is to
highlight the flexibility of the bargaining approach to intergenerational justice and to show
that it can accommodate some common intuitions concerning the intergenerational allocation of resources.3 Theoretically, it may be argued that, unlike in the Rawlsian tradition, an
asymmetric treatment of generations is not inconsistent with the construction of the state
of nature, given that agents are not placed behind a veil of ignorance and impartiality is not
a key requirement of justice. Formally, the bargaining approach can be easily adapted to
allow for some limitations on the veto power of future generations. To do so, let wi denote
3

In the literature on climate change, discounting is used in the authoritative Stern review [16]. For a
thorough discussion, see Roemer [14].
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the weight associated to generation i, where wi ≥ 1 for all i. We can modify the Hobbesian
SWR by requiring an allocation p as weakly better than another allocation q whenever for
all e > 0 and for all i with qi − pi > ewi there exists j with pj − qj > ewj . The higher wi ,
the lower the weight of generation i in the sense that, for the same e, this generation must
have a higher welfare gain in order to object. Using the same manipulations as before, this
³
´
³
´
qi −pi
pi −qi
corresponds to requiring that max wi
> e ⇒ max wi
> e, that is:
i∈N

i∈N

Definition 4 (Discounted Hobbesian SWR) p <Hw q if and only if
µ
max
i∈N

p i − qi
wi

¶

µ
≥ max
i∈N

qi − p i
wi

¶
.

As before, the following is immediate:
Proposition 4 Let w ∈ Rn be a given vector of weights assigned to each generation in N .
´
³
´
³
For any p, q ∈ Rn , p is unobjectionable against q if and only if max piw−qi i ≥ max qiw−pi i
i∈N

3.3

i∈N

Hobbesian social welfare judgments

One great attraction of the welfare criterion <H is its applicability to infinite societies:
although a Social Welfare Relation arising from intergenerational bargaining cannot be based
on any standard bargaining model with an infinite set of players, the advantage of our
proposal is that endowing each generation with veto power in an Hobbesian world makes
the number of generations irrelevant for the analysis. In this case, the welfare criterion
<H can be generalised to focus on the supremum of the welfare differences, so that in the
intergenerational context with an infinite number of generations p <HI q if and only if
sup(pi − qi ) ≥ sup (qi − pi ) .
i∈N

i∈N

The Hobbesian SWR thus defined on RN has various attractive properties in the evaluation of infinite utility streams. For it is reflexive and complete, it satisfies SPO and it does
not incur any of the standard problems faced by classical utilitarianism. For example, it
provides consistent welfare judgments even if the welfare streams are unbounded. Moreover,
10

it is possible to prove that the Hobbesian SWR <HI on RN satisfies the property of upper
semi-continuity with respect to the sup topology as defined by Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura
and Xu ([11]).
Putting aside for the moment the specific issues concerning intergenerational justice,
does <H lead in general to reasonable social welfare judgments? Consider the sentence: ‘If
a potential immigrant can increase his utility, by immigrating, more than what any of the
citizens of the host country loses, then immigration is justified (independently of the number
of citizens in the host country who lose welfare).’ The Hobbesian SWR <H precisely captures
the intuitions behind this statement and it provides normative foundations for a liberal
immigration policy: if no individual in a society can forcefully object to immigration (in the
bargaining theoretic sense analysed above), then <H states that the potential immigrant has
a right to migrate. This seems intuitively reasonable and normatively appealing, at least
if one endorses the individualistic perspective underlying <H . Indeed, first-order normative
objections against migration very often come from communitarians (see, for example, [17]),
who regard supra-individual entities (communities or nations) as the relevant unit of analysis.
A different type of objections can be related to the possible ‘extremism’ of the SWR, as
the following example illustrates.
Example 1 (Immigration overload ) Let the utility of an indigenous agent in a country without immigration be α, dropping to α − ε if there is immigration; normalise to 0
the utility of a prospective immigrant still out of the country, and γ for a new immigrant. Finally assume that an ‘old’ immigrant allineates perfectly his preferences to the
rest of the society (so he would ‘suffer’ from the presence of further immigrants, and his
utility would drop to α − ε). Consider a situation in which there is only one citizen in
the home country and there are a large number of potential immigrants outside the country borders. If (α − ε, γ, 0, 0, 0, ...) <H (α, 0, 0, 0, 0, ...), so that γ > ε, it also follows that
(α − ε, α − ε, γ, 0, 0, ...) <H (α, α, 0, 0, 0, ...). As a consequence, a society might be quickly
‘overrun’ by immigration.
Two counterarguments can be made at this point. First, albeit possibly ‘extreme’, unlimited migration is not evidently a bad thing. It can be interpreted as a policy of free
11

movement of people, which liberals (and nonliberals) have long advocated in history. We are
not saying that we should advocate free movement, but only that free movement and (potentially) unlimited migration per se do not seem to undermine the normative rationale of <H .
Moreover, at a different level of abstraction, one may argue that as more and more people
migrate it is unrealistic to keep the benefit (resp. costs) of migration (resp. of receiving
immigrants) constant.
Second, even if one rejects the previous argument, extreme cases are arguably not sufficient - per se - to disqualify a SWR. Both the Rawlsian and the utilitarian SWRs, for
instance, are vulnerable to ‘extreme’ counterexamples. Extreme cases are relevant, but they
are only part of the story. They can be set aside either if they are unrealistic (but this is
a weak reply from a normative viewpoint), or if they are extreme consequences of otherwise desirable principles: for example, the egalitarianism of the maximin is defensible, even
though it may be extreme. Therefore the issue is whether the SWR incorporates some relevant normative intuitions - even though it may take them to an extreme. Arguably, at least
in the immigration example, the normative intuitions behind <H seem reasonable.
Although the prescriptions of <H are defensible in the immigration example, there are
other scenarios in which they may be less convincing. For example, <H could be used to
justify a dictator amassing a gigantic wealth provided his increase in welfare is superior to
the loss in welfare for each of his 1 million subjects. And yet, maybe here the real objection
is one of procedure, that is dictatorship is undesirable - if the agent is, say, a scientist, why
not increase his welfare if nobody loses more than he gains? Also, it is perhaps unrealistic
that the dictator amassing gigantic wealth will not impoverish his citizens to the point that
their loss of welfare overshadows any pleasure the dictator may enjoy.
It is true, however, that <H may have some undesirable implications. Because distributional concerns are irrelevant, it allows for a situation in which some agent (not necessarily
a dictator) gets a disproportionately high share of resources provided his gain outweighs
the individual losses of a huge number of other individuals. The SWR has a strongly individualistic flavour in that it pitches one agent against each and every other agent taken
individually. This could imply protection of individuals (against other individuals) but it
could also imply primacy of an individual against all others, as in the dictator’s example. In
12

the intergenerational context, this implies that the Hobbesian SWR does not rule out the
possibility that one generation gets a disproportionately high share of natural resources. It
is worth noting, however, that <H does satisfy the axiom of Minimal Equity.4
Minimal Equity (ME): For some p, q ∈ Rn and i, j ∈ N , qi < pi < pj < qj , ph = qh , all
h 6= i, j, and p < q.
Besides, the problem just highlighted is one that the utilitarian welfare ordering also
shares. And in a similar vein5 we can correct the Hobbesian SWR by requiring that any
allocation guarantees to each generation a minimal level of utility, so that only if utility
exceed such critical level it is deemed valuable. This is a rather natural restriction in the
intergenerational context, where the critical utility level can be justified on the basis of
sustainability concerns (for a forceful discussion of this notion of sustainability in the context
of climate change, see Roemer [14]). So given a vector c = (c1 , c2 , ...) of critical utilities we
require any allocation to Pareto dominate the critical allocation. Then we can modify the
Hobbesian SWR as:
Definition 5 (Critical Utility Hobbesian SWR) p <Hcu q if and only if p <H q and
p > c.
The problem with <Hcu is that it may solve some problems, but at the potential cost f
reducing its effectiveness, because <Hcu is both intransitive and incomplete.
There are additional shortcomings of the Hobbesian SWR which cannot be easily ‘fixed’:
although it has the merit of being a complete relation satisfying the Strong Pareto property,
the Hobbesian SWR is not necessarily transitive, as the following examples show.
Example 2 (Exploiting future generations) Suppose there are only three generations,
and consider the egalitarian allocation (1, 1, 1). An allocation which transferred utility from
the second to the first generation would be equally acceptable, since (1, 1, 1) ∼H (2, 0, 1),
and this transfer to earlier generations could again be repeated, since (2, 0, 1) ∼H (3, 0, 0).
4
5

See D’Aspremont [7].
See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [5].
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Yet, this latter allocation is strictly preferred to the initial egalitarian one, since (3, 0, 0) ÂH
(1, 1, 1). So transitivity fails, since
(1, 1, 1) ∼H (2, 0, 1) ∼H (3, 0, 0) but (3, 0, 0) ÂH (1, 1, 1)
This example exploits the fact that since for the Hobbesian SWR the comparison between
the utilities if the most and least favoured generation are all that matters for the ranking
of any two infinite utility streams, there are many allocations that are indifferent to one
another, generating cycles. Unfortunately, disturbing implications of the Hobbesian SWR
remain even if we restrict attention to its asymmetric part, as shown in the following example.
Example 3 (Trading places) Suppose there are only three generations, and consider the
allocation (2, 1, 0) where generations are treated progressively worse the later they are. The
third generation could successfully claim 2 for itself by decreasing of one unit each the utility
of the other two generations, that is

H

(1, 0, 2) ÂH (2, 1, 0). Similarly, the second generation

could now argue for a similar claim, again decreasing the utility of the other two generations
by one unit, since

H

(0, 2, 1) ÂH (1, 0, 2); and the first generation could now make exactly the

same argument. This however generates the cycle
(2, 1, 0) ÂH (0, 2, 1) ÂH (1, 0, 2) ÂH (2, 1, 0)
For a practical application of <H , the existence of ‘permutation cycles’ of the type above
requires some additional mechanism or domain limitation capable of selecting one of the
elements of the cycle, or making sure that the presence of such cycles does not preclude
the existence of a maximal element. That rules of justice may be cyclical is well-grounded
in history: Naeh and Segal [12], for example, argue that some Talmudic rules of justice are
deliberately cyclical, and discuss Talmud-inspired ways of breaking the deadlock (or, in some
cases, for not doing so).
In the intergenerational context with an infinite number of generations, however, as noted
in the introduction, we face a trade off between different principles, and therefore it should
not be surprising that given that the Hobbesian SWR is reflexive and complete and it satisfies
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the Strong Pareto Principle, and it is upper semi-continuous in the sup norm, transitivity
has to be sacrificed.

4

The modified Hobbesian SWR

The cyclical pattern of the previous example would be also ruled out if we tempered this
Hobbesian world in which each generation is pitted against every other generation by requiring each generation to exercise its veto power behind an intertemporal veil of ignorance:
generation i knows its place in allocation p, but evaluates the alternative vector q in the
ignorance of which place it could occupy in this competing allocation. Focusing on societies with a finite number of agents, a modified Hobbesian SWR can be formally defined as
follows:
∗

Definition 6 (Modified Hobbesian SWR) p <H q if and only if max(pi −qj ) ≥ max(qj −
i,j∈N

i,j∈N

pi ).
∗

∗

It is immediate to see that <H ⊂<H , and that <H is reflexive and complete. Moreover,
we can establish the following:
∗

Proposition 5 The Modified Social Welfare Relation <H is transitive.
Proof. Let p denote the permutation of p such that the components are ranked in ascending
order, so that p1 is the welfare level of the worst-off agent, p2 of the second worst-off agent,
∗

and so on. Then max(pi − qj ) ≥ max(qj − pi ) ⇔ pn − q 1 ≥ q n − p1 . Therefore if p <H q
i,j∈N

i,j∈N

∗

and q <H r, then pn − q 1 ≥ q n − p1 and q n − r1 ≥ rn − q 1 . The latter inequalities imply
pn − q 1 + q n − r1 ≥ q n − p1 + rn − q 1 or, equivalently, pn − r1 ≥ rn − p1 , as desired.
∗

Furthermore, it can easily be checked that <H satisfies Anonymity and Minimal Equity,
but if N = {1, ..., n} with n > 2 it does not satisfy Strong Pareto Optimality. Yet it does
satisfy the following standard condition.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): p >> q ⇒ p Â q.
Furthermore, although in general it does not satisfy CU, it does satisfy the following
requirement:
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Cardinality and comparability (CC): Let a be any real number and b be any positive number.
Then for any p, q ∈ Rn , p < q if and only if a + bp < a + bq.
∗

It is again interesting to note that in 2-person societies <H =<U , and therefore also
∗

∗

<H =<H . Indeed, in 2-person societies it can be shown that <H satisfies Strong Pareto
Optimality and CU.
∗

A further property of <H that is worth noting is that it is explicitly representable.
Consider the following result:
Proposition 6 ([7], Theorem 3.5.1, p.58) If a SWO < satisfies WPO and CC, then there
exists a numerical function g, homogeneous of degree one, such that for any p, q ∈ Rn ,
P
P
pb + g(p − pb) > qb + g(q − qb) implies p Â q, where pb = n1 ni=1 pi and qb = n1 ni=1 qi .
∗

In the case of <H , let g(x) = 21 [maxi∈N xi + mini∈N xi ]. Then pb+g(p− pb) > qb+g(q − qb) if
and only if pb+ 21 [maxi∈N (pi − pb) + mini∈N (pi − pb)] > qb+ 12 [maxi∈N (qi − qb) + mini∈N (qi − qb)].
The modified Hobbesian SWO can be seen as mediating between a notion of justice as
mutual advantage (see the above discussion of bargaining in the state of nature) and justice
as impartiality. This can be seen by noting that, unlike <H , it does satisfy Anonymity in
general.

5

Concluding remarks

In this paper we have studied the idea of analysing the problem of the intergenerational
allocation of resources from the standpoint of justice as mutual advantage, rather than the
more traditional approach that views justice as impartiality in the treatment of different
generations.
This approach has some advantages. First of all, the fact that infinite streams of utilities are the object poses none of the usual difficulties in the analysis. Although a Social
Welfare Relation arising from intergenerational bargaining cannot be based on any standard
bargaining model with an infinite set of players, the number of generations ceases to play a
pivotal role if we assume that each generation can exercise veto power.
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Secondly, the Hobbesian approach in which each generation is ‘at war’ with each other
generation seems appropriate in the context of intergenerational bargaining. We are considering a notion of justice as mutual advantage, but as there will never be a situation in which
different generations coexist, it seems reasonable to assume that each generation operates in
isolation, without forming any coalition with future generations. Indeed, it is easy to conceptualise a future generation objecting to the waste of resources of one of its predecessors.
This, however, is also the Achille’s heel of the Hobbesian Social Welfare Relation we propose:
in its purest version it suffers from intransitivities, while in its modified version it assumes
that different generations might take an interest in each other’s welfare.
In this respect, the Hobbesian Social Welfare Relation suffers from the usual negative
results that we find in the standard literature, pointing to the fact that some shortcomings
may be eliminated by restricting the domain, for instance making future utility depend on
the current levels at which the resource is depleted. In general, we hope to have enriched the
conceptual apparatus by which we deal with the problem of intergenerational allocation of
resources. The ultimate validity of the Hobbesian citerion remains an open question, needing
much additional research and discussion.
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